How to use quantum theory locally to explain "non-local" correlations by Healey, Richard
HOW TO USE QUANTUM THEORY LOCALLY TO EXPLAIN “NON-LOCAL” 
CORRELATIONS 
  
Richard Healey1
Abstract 
 
J.S. Bell’s work has convinced many that correlations in violation of CHSH inequalities show that 
the world itself is non-local, and that there is an apparently essential conflict between any sharp 
formulation of quantum theory and relativity. Against this consensus, this paper argues that there 
is no conflict between quantum theory and relativity. Quantum theory itself helps us explain such 
(otherwise) puzzling correlations in a way that contradicts neither Bell’s intuitive locality principle 
nor his local causality condition. The argument depends on understanding quantum theory along 
pragmatist lines, and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain. Quantum theory 
is compatible with Bell’s intuitive locality principle and with his local causality condition not 
because it conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so 
understood. 
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1. Introduction 
In a series of seminal papers, John Bell argued that the predictions of any acceptable theory 
satisfying a condition he called “local causality” must, in some cases, conflict with those of 
quantum theory. These cases concern certain correlations displayed by pairs of observable 
macroscopic events, where each event in a pair occurs at essentially the same time but in a 
different place. Bell concluded that quantum theory is not a locally causal theory. Subsequent 
experiments have amply confirmed quantum theory’s predictions in these cases. Bell took his 
condition of local causality to be motivated by the intuitive principle that “The direct causes (and 
effects) of events are near by, and even the indirect causes (and effects) are no further away than 
permitted by the velocity of light” (Bell [1990], p.105), a principle closely associated with 
relativity theory. Quantum theory’s failure to be locally causal puts it in serious tension with this 
intuitive principle and the relativity theory associated with it. But quantum theory’s success in 
predicting the observed correlations then challenges the intuitive principle itself, and makes one 
reconsider its association with relativity. 
 The dialectic of the previous paragraph has produced something of a consensus among 
those most closely influenced by Bell’s writings that the observed correlations demonstrate the 
falsity of the intuitive principle—in that sense the world itself is non-local. There is less agreement 
about the implications for relativity. Some maintain the need for a preferred frame in any 
acceptable theory capable of accounting for the observed correlations, while acknowledging that 
theory’s implication that this frame is empirically inaccessible. Others continue to seek a 
relativistically invariant account of the observed correlations within a theory that is only 
approximately empirically equivalent to quantum theory. But again there is widespread agreement 
with Bell that there is an “apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation [of quantum 
theory] and relativity.” (Bell [2004], p.172) 
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 Against this consensus, I shall argue that there is no conflict between quantum theory and 
relativity, and that quantum theory itself helps us explain the (otherwise) puzzling correlations in a 
way that contradicts neither Bell’s intuitive locality principle nor his local causality condition. The 
argument will depend on understanding quantum theory along pragmatist lines I have outlined 
elsewhere [in press], and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain 
[forthcoming]. To avoid misunderstandings I begin by pointing out that quantum theory is 
compatible with Bell’s intuitive principle and with his local causality condition not because it 
conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so understood. 
 I foresee two reactions among readers less familiar with the grounds for consensus among 
those most closely influenced by Bell’s writings. People continue to claim that the upshot of Bell’s 
theorem in its various forms is that no local realistic theory can account for violations of so-called 
Bell inequalities. If you hold this opinion, then you may think the reason why quantum theory is 
able to offer a convincing local explanation of correlations that violate these inequalities is simply 
that it is not a realistic theory. There is a sense of “realism” in which something like this is right. 
But there are other senses in which it is wrong. Those making the claim rarely say exactly what 
they mean by “realistic”, and even more rarely show how giving up realism enables us to use 
quantum theory satisfactorily to explain violations of Bell inequalities. 
 Other readers may see no need to interpret quantum theory one way rather than another in 
the light of the theory’s successful prediction of “non-local” correlations, including violations of 
Bell inequalities. For what more could be required of an explanatory theory than that it enable one 
successfully to anticipate nature in such an impressive manner? They may go on to note the 
extraordinary success of relativistic quantum field theory in its Poincaré invariant form and to 
point to its satisfaction of the so-called microcausality condition (vanishing of commutators 
between local observables at space-like separation) as demonstrating conformity both to local 
causality and to the demands of relativity. 
 But matters are not so simple, as Bell’s brilliant papers make clear. Bell himself anticipated 
this appeal to relativistic quantum field theory and convincingly explained why it fails to square 
quantum theory with local causality or fundamental Poincaré invariance. And his severe critique 
of contemporary formulations of quantum theory casts serious doubt on the adequacy of its 
explanations of the puzzling correlations associated with his name. In the next section of this paper 
I present Bell’s criticisms, and in section 3 I show how a pragmatist interpretation of quantum 
theory is able to evade them. 
 Recent work by several authors1
 While Bell himself allowed that the statement of probabilistic independence he derived 
from his locality condition may not embody everyone’s idea of local causality, some have adapted 
independently developed analyses of causal relations to this case to argue that the failure of such 
probabilistic independence does indeed evince superluminal causation. In section 7 I address 
arguments for superluminal causation that seek to exploit connections between causal and 
counterfactual relations. While acknowledging some such connection, I reply that the only 
 has further honed Bell’s argument as to why any theory 
proposed as a candidate for explaining EPR-Bell correlations must violate local causality. This 
work is recalled in section 4. Section 5 then uses the pragmatist interpretation sketched in section 3 
to explain why quantum theory itself is not a candidate theory in this sense, so the argument does 
not apply to it. With the ground thus cleared, section 6 shows how quantum theory helps explain 
“non-local” correlations involving two or more “particles”, including those associated with the 
GHZ state. 
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counterfactuals that hold in this case manifest epistemic rather than causal connections between 
distant events. Section 8 goes on to explore how quantum theory exploits the possibility of private 
informational links between an agent and events (s)he neither observes nor brings about, in ways 
that are strikingly independent of the spatiotemporal relations between them. This possibility has 
interesting implications for theories of chance in a relativistic world. In conclusion I distinguish 
various senses of ‘non-local’ and review how we are able to use quantum theory locally to explain 
“non-local” correlations in a relativistically invariant manner without recourse to any superluminal 
causation. 
 
2. Bell’s critique of current formulations of quantum mechanics: A response 
It is ironic that the man who first realized the foundational significance of the fact that quantum 
mechanics predicts violations of his eponymous inequalities was also one of the severest critics of 
the present state of that theory. Bell, at least, did not accept that we have an exact formulation of a 
serious part of quantum theory capable of providing us with a satisfactory explanation of the 
violations of Bell inequalities it so successfully predicted. The best way to introduce a way of 
understanding the quantum theory that, I maintain, helps us locally to explain “non-local” 
correlations is to show how it evades Bell’s critique of contemporary formulations of quantum 
theory. 
 Bell rejected as inexact any formulation of quantum theory that used words like 
‘macroscopic’, ‘irreversible’, ‘information’ or (especially) ‘measurement’ in what he called its 
fundamental interpretive rules. He thought that the presence of such words in a formulation of 
quantum theory introduces an unacceptable imprecision that leaves entirely too much to the 
discretion of the theoretical physicist. He especially focused his critique on the role of 
‘measurement’ in stating the Born Rule linking a quantum state to probabilities of measurement 
outcomes, and the effect of measurement in “collapsing” the quantum state onto an eigenstate of 
the measured observable. As he put it 
   …the word comes loaded with meaning from everyday life, meaning which is entirely 
inappropriate in the quantum context. When it is said that something is ‘measured’ it is 
difficult not to think of the result as referring to some pre-existing property of the object in 
question. … 
the word has had such a damaging effect on the discussion, that I think it should now be 
banned altogether in quantum mechanics. (Bell [2004], p.216) 
 
 By itself, this semantic objection is not convincing. Most, if not all, quantum 
“measurements” of an observable are processes that would count classically as revealing some 
pre-existing property—the value of the corresponding dynamical variable. Preservation of the 
reference of a term like ‘measurement’ under scientific change is standard linguistic practice. 
Secondly, what are called quantum “measurements” can provide vital information, which is the 
essential function of any measurement. 
 But Bell had a more substantial objection to the use of ‘measurement’ in a formulation of 
quantum theory. In his words: 
The first charge against ‘measurement’, in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics, 
is that it anchors there the shifty split of the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. (Bell 
[2004], p.216) 
The split (often called the Heisenberg cut or schnitt) is manifest in the different ways ‘system’ and 
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‘apparatus’ are treated in the Born Rule for single probabilities, which may be stated as follows 
probρ(QεΔ)=Tr(ρPQ[Δ])          (1) 
where ρ is a density operator representing a quantum state and the statement ‘QεΔ’ locates the 
value of dynamical variable Q (on some system s) in set Δ of real numbers.2
 Dirac and von Neumann proposed to paper over this division by taking the quantum state  
of a system indirectly to assign it corresponding properties, in accordance with what has become 
known as the (generalized) eigenvalue-eigenstate link: 
 The split appears 
between system (assigned state ρ) and apparatus (whose final condition is described as registering 
outcome QεΔ). However this division is made, the Born Rule treats system and apparatus 
differently. The condition of the system is specified by assigning it a quantum state, while that of 
the apparatus is given by assigning it a property that serves to register the outcome. 
(EE) A system has property QεΔ if and only if its quantum state is an eigenstate of PQ[Δ] with 
eigenvalue 1. 
(EE) implies that a system has a dynamical property in a quantum state just in case the Born Rule 
assigns the property probability 1 in that state. 
 This does not yet restore parity between system and apparatus. If the apparatus is itself a 
quantum system, then its condition should also be given by a quantum state that serves to register 
the outcome in accordance with (EE). If the system is initially in an eigenstate of Q with 
eigenvalue qi while the apparatus is (a quantum system) in an eigenstate of an operator R 
corresponding to recording dynamical variable R, then all is well. Formally, there is a unitary 
evolution 
|qi 〉⊗|r0〉 → |ψi〉⊗|ri〉          (2) 
interpretable in accordance with (EE) as an interaction between a system s on which Q has value qi 
before the interaction (and afterwards just in case |ψi〉=|qi〉), while the value of R on an apparatus 
system m changes from its initial value r0 to a final value ri that does indeed serve to record on m 
the value of Q on s. But notoriously all is not then well if the system is initially in a non-trivial 
superposition of orthogonal eigenstates of Q 
(∑i  ci |qi 〉) ⊗ |r0〉 →∑i  ci  (|ψi〉⊗|ri〉)          (3) 
It now follows from (EE) that after the interaction R on apparatus system m has no value that can 
serve to register an outcome—in manifest contradiction with experiment. 
 Bell ([2004], chapter 23) documented two responses to this difficulty, one by Dirac, the 
other by Landau and Lifshitz. Dirac’s response was more radical: he simply denied that the 
quantum state of a system evolves unitarily during a measurement on that system, and indeed 
refused to treat this as a quantum mechanical interaction between system and apparatus. 
Accordingly, he replaced (3) by the stochastic evolution 
(∑i  ci |qi 〉) → |qi〉 , with probability |ci|2        (4) 
(which von Neumann called process 1). Landau and Lifshitz endorsed (3), but then appealed to the 
special classical nature of the apparatus to infer (in apparent contradiction to (EE)) that after the 
measurement R has some value ri on m, with probability |ci|2, and that the state of s is |ψi〉. 
 This lack of unanimity among canonical formulations of quantum theory is already 
worrying. Moreover both responses apparently attribute to measurement a unique dynamical role 
in quantum theory, since it involves a stochastic change in the quantum state of the measured 
system quite different from deterministic, linear Schrödinger evolution—the notorious collapse of 
the wave-packet. If there are indeed two dynamic processes inherent in quantum theory, then a 
precise formulation of the theory must specify exactly when each process occurs. Bell inveighed 
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against the lack of precision in formulations that took collapse to occur only on “measurement”, 
interaction with a “classical” or “macroscopic” system, in an “irreversible” interaction, etc. He 
pointed out that simply by reconsidering the division between quantum system and classical 
apparatus a physicist can change the predictions of the theory. 
the following rule for placing the Heisenberg split, although ambiguous in principle, is 
sufficiently unambiguous for practical purposes: 
Put sufficiently much into the quantum system that the inclusion of more would not 
significantly alter practical predictions. 
 ..... 
 The problem is this: quantum mechanics is fundamentally about ‘observations’. It 
necessarily divides the world into two parts, a part which is observed and a part which does 
the observing. The results depend in detail on just how this division is made, but no definite 
prescription for it is given. All that we have is a recipe which, because of practical human 
limitations, is sufficiently unambiguous for practical purposes. 
 (Bell [2004], p.124) 
We can distinguish two separate problems here. If collapse is a physical process that 
discontinuously changes a system’s quantum state on measurement, and that state completely 
describes the system’s dynamical properties in accordance with (EE), then what properties 
quantum theory ascribes to a system at a time depends on whether a quantum state of (a 
super-system of) the system has collapsed by that time—and that depends on the placement of the 
division between system and apparatus. This is an internal consistency problem that arises only 
once one accepts (EE) and that wave-collapse is a physical process. The second problem is that the 
“practical predictions” of quantum theory are themselves sensitive to the placement of the 
Heisenberg cut. That is, by choosing to move the cut a physicist could alter what quantum theory 
predicts would be observed in a given situation, however difficult it may be experimentally to 
realize that situation and to perform observations capable of discriminating between these 
alternative predictions. 
 Bell admitted that this second problem did not affect the adequacy of quantum theory for 
all practical purposes (FAPP). To argue that FAPP is not good enough he compared quantum 
mechanics unfavorably to classical mechanics: 
In classical mechanics we have a model of a theory which is not intrinsically inexact, for it 
neither needs nor is embarrassed by an observer. 
At least one can envisage an accurate theory, of the universe, to which the restricted 
account is an approximation. 
 (Bell [2004], p.125) 
 …[quantum] theory is fundamentally approximate. 
 …quantum mechanics…is…intrinsically inexact. 
 (op. cit., p.126, p.127) 
 I respond by first pointing out that every application of a physical theory, whether classical 
or quantum, is FAPP. To apply a theory one must consider some physical system and either ignore 
the rest of the world or model its effect on this system in a highly simplified way. In both classical 
and quantum theories, including more in the system may lead to more accurate (and a fortiori 
different) predictions at the cost of greater complexity. This is true even if the system is the whole 
universe, as it often is in theories of cosmology—where no model is expected to include minor 
details of local happenings such as what the cosmologist had for breakfast. 
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 Bell’s reply would be that only in classical physics can one “envisage” a model 
representing the whole universe, in all its details. If the theory were true, this model could be 
perfectly accurate. Nothing in the model need be designated “observer”: though some parts of the 
model might be supposed to represent observers as physical systems. Simplifications of this model 
might “in principle” be arrived at by controlled approximations. 
 But there are serious grounds for skepticism here. It may be incoherent to suppose that 
anyone could build himself (as a physical system) into the model and then go on to use it to predict 
details of his own behavior. In any case, such a complete, detailed and accurate model would 
exceed human cognitive limitations, in respect of data gathering, presentation, and processing. 
One might imagine an enormously complex mathematical structure intended to represent the 
universe completely accurately within classical physics. But only in use would this structure 
represent the universe or anything else, for representation is a three-place relation between 
structure, target and user. It would then follow from the impossibility of using a structure within 
classical physics rich enough to count as a complete, detailed and accurate model of the universe 
that one cannot envisage an accurate classical physical theory, of the universe, to which a 
restricted account is an approximation. To be accurate, the theory would have to permit a 
representation of the universe in all its details. But that would require us to be able to deploy a 
mathematical structure so complex as to exceed our human limitations. Needless to say, this is in 
no way an indictment of classical physics, which proved very successful in fulfilling all the 
essential scientific functions of predicting, controlling and explaining phenomena until its 
limitations in these respects were revealed and then exceeded by quantum theory. 
 Even though the second “problem” is therefore seen to dissolve under closer examination, 
Bell’s analysis correctly exhibited a disanalogy between quantum and classical physics. In 
classical physics various elements of a model (dynamical variables, system state and trajectory in 
phase space, etc.) are used to represent (a portion of) the physical world when the model is applied. 
But in quantum theory as usually understood, it is a central function of corresponding elements of 
a model (observables, quantum state and evolution in Hilbert space) to issue in predictions for the 
statistics of observations on something in the physical world. They can serve this function only if 
whatever plays the role of observer does not itself correspond to anything in the model. So in 
quantum theory there is an additional reason why one cannot envisage a complete, detailed and 
accurate model of the universe. This disanalogy is interesting, and provides a clue to a better way 
of understanding quantum theory. But it does not reveal any defect in quantum theory as currently 
formulated, as Bell’s charges that the theory is fundamentally approximate and intrinsically 
inexact seem to imply. 
 What about the first problem raised by Bell’s discussion of the shifty split? The problem 
was that what properties quantum theory ascribes to a system at a time depends on whether a 
quantum state of (a super-system of) the system has collapsed by that time—which in turn depends 
on the placement of the division between system and apparatus. As I noted, this problem arises 
only on the assumptions that collapse is a physical process which discontinuously changes a 
system’s quantum state on measurement, and that a system’s state completely describes its 
dynamical properties in accordance with (EE). But these assumptions are not clearly part of 
orthodox quantum theory, despite figuring in Dirac’s and von Neumann’s seminal texts.3
 
 The 
cleanest way to solve this problem is simply to drop both assumptions and to articulate an 
interpretation of quantum theory without them. I turn now to that task. 
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3. Sketch of a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory 
According to the pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory I outline in ([in press]), neither 
quantum states nor observables nor dynamical laws represent or describe the condition or behavior 
of any physical system. These elements function in other ways when an agent uses a quantum 
model to predict or explain phenomena by applying quantum theory. (EE) fails not because the 
quantum state incompletely describes an individual physical system (as Einstein argued), but 
because it does not describe an individual physical system at all: the following weaker principle 
also fails. 
Eigenstate-Eigenvalue If a system’s quantum state is an eigenstate of an observable, then 
   Implication  (EVI)  that observable has the associated eigenvalue. 
 This pragmatist interpretation rejects EVI and assigns the quantum state two roles. One is 
in the algorithm provided by the Born Rule for assigning quantum probabilities to appropriate 
claims of the form QΔ(s) : The value of Q on s lies in Δ, where Q is a dynamical variable, s is a 
quantum system and Δ is a Borel set of real numbers. But the significance of a claim QΔ(s) varies 
with the circumstances to which it relates. Accordingly, a quantum state plays a second role by 
modulating the content of a claim QΔ(s) by modifying its inferential relations to other claims. 
  Any application of quantum theory involves claims describing a physical situation. While 
it is considered appropriate to make claims about where individual particles are detected 
contributing to the interference pattern in a contemporary two-slit interference experiment, claims 
about through which slit each particle went are typically alleged to be “meaningless”. In its second 
role the quantum state offers guidance on the inferential powers, and hence the appropriateness, of 
descriptive claims of the form QΔ(s)―of what I call a Non-Quantum Magnitude Claim (NQMC). 
 The key idea here is that even assuming unitary evolution of the joint quantum state of 
system and environment, delocalization of system state coherence into the environment will 
typically render appropriate descriptive claims about experimental outcomes and the condition of 
apparatus and other macroscopic objects by endowing these claims with enough content to license 
an agent to adopt epistemic attitudes toward them, and in particular to apply the Born Rule. But an 
application of quantum theory to determine whether this is so will not require referring to any 
system as “macroscopic”, as an “apparatus” or as an “environment”. All that counts is how a 
quantum state of a super-system evolves under the influence of a Hamiltonian associated with an 
interaction between the system of interest and the rest of that super-system. 
 It is important to note that since the formulation of the Born Rule now involves no explicit 
or implicit reference to “measurement”, Bell’s strictures against the presence of the term 
‘measurement’ in a precise formulation of quantum theory are met. None of the other proscribed 
terms ‘classical’, ‘macroscopic’, ‘irreversible’, or ‘information’ appear in its stead. 
 Since an agent’s assignment of a quantum state does not serve to represent a system’s 
properties, her reassignment of a “collapsed” state on gaining new information represents no 
change in that system’s properties. That is why collapse is not a dynamic process, on this 
interpretation of quantum theory. Nor, of course, is Schrödinger evolution of a quantum state. A 
quantum model does not serve to represent change in dynamical properties of a system, because it 
does not represent the dynamical properties of any system. Consequently, a formulation of 
quantum theory has no need to include a statement distinguishing the circumstances in which 
different dynamical processes occur. The importance of eliminating this need should be clear from 
section 2's discussion of Bell’s critique of orthodox formulations that use ‘measurement’ or other 
proscribed terms when drawing this distinction. An agent can use quantum theory to track changes 
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of the dynamical properties of a system by noting what descriptive claims of the form QΔ(s) are 
both sufficiently licensed and warranted at various times. But quantum theory itself does not imply 
any such claim, even when an agent has correctly assigned a system a quantum state that assigns 
the claim probability 1 via the Born Rule.  
 Quantum states are relational on this interpretation. The function of Born probabilities is to 
offer an agent authoritative advice on how to apportion degrees of belief concerning appropriate 
claims of the form QΔ(s) which the agent is not currently in a position to check. It follows that a 
system does not have a unique quantum state. For when agents (actually or potentially) occupy 
relevantly different physical situations they should assign different quantum states to one and the 
same system, even though these different quantum states are perfectly objective. Each will 
consequently assign different Born probabilities to a single claim of the form QΔ(s) concerning 
system s in a given situation. These different probabilities will then be equally objective and 
equally correct. This feature of the interpretation will prove crucial in what follows. 
 On this pragmatist interpretation, quantum theory by itself can explain nothing, because it 
describes nothing. The novel elements appearing in its models represent no physical systems and 
cannot be used to demonstrate representations of the phenomena to be explained: For quantum 
theory does not imply statements one can use to make claims about natural phenomena that 
describe or represent features of those phenomena. But quantum theory nevertheless helps us to 
explain an extraordinary variety of regularities in the physical world using representational 
resources from outside of quantum theory. It can do this because there is more to the informational 
structures quantum theory supplies than theoretical models involving quantum states, 
Hamiltonian, Lagrangian and other operators, and (solutions to) the Schrödinger equation and 
relativistic generalizations. Implicit in the theory are rules for using these models to guide one in 
making claims and forming beliefs about physical systems to which such models may be applied 
but which these models do not themselves describe or represent. 
 The first step in using quantum theory to help explain a regularity such as those exhibited 
by EPR-Bell correlations is to say what the regularity is. The explanandum regularity itself must 
be expressed in suitable claims of the form QΔ(s) or other non-quantum claims taken to supervene 
on them, but the circumstances in which it obtains may be described in other non-quantum terms. 
Cartwright ([1983], chapter 7) called this first stage of theory entry giving a prepared description 
of the explanandum and the conditions under which it holds. But note that at this stage we have not 
yet entered the domain of quantum theory, since the prepared description is not in terms of 
quantum states and operators and there has been no mention of probabilities. When the 
mathematical modeling apparatus provided by quantum theory is now deployed, the prepared 
description of the regularity is not shown to be a deterministic or stochastic consequence of laws or 
principles of quantum theory, dynamical or otherwise. 
 Quantum theory plays a different explanatory role. This is to show that an agent should 
expect the regularity to hold under these conditions by applying one or more mathematical models 
of quantum theory to the prepared description. Quantum theory tells an agent what to expect by 
guiding his credences in claims of the form QΔ(s) that have now been taken to represent the 
explanandum regularity. 
 The Born Rule plays a key role here: it figures, explicitly or implicitly, in all explanatory 
applications of quantum theory. Quantum theory contributes to our explanatory projects by 
providing us with a general set of techniques for calculating Born probabilities that tell us what we 
should expect, in familiar as well as unfamiliar situations. These include general techniques for 
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determining quantum states, since the Born Rule can play its role only when supplied with a 
quantum state. How these techniques guide an agent in applying quantum theory to explain 
“non-local” correlations will be a matter of some concern in section 6. 
 The Born Rule may be legitimately applied to determine probabilities only of those 
non-quantum claims of the form QΔ(s) that are suitably licensed in the conditions in which the 
relevant systems are taken to be present. When the Born Rule is used in explaining a regularity, it 
is the prepared description of the explanandum that specifies the relevant systems and surrounding 
conditions. Quantum theory furnishes no precise rule specifying exactly when this description 
legitimizes application of the Born Rule to non-quantum claims expressing the regularity to be 
explained. Knowing when it is legitimate to apply the Born Rule here is a learned skill on a par 
with those needed at an earlier stage in preparing the description of the explanandum regularity 
and assigning a quantum state to a selected system. One who lacks such skills cannot be said to 
know quantum theory, no matter how effectively he can write down and solve the Schrödinger 
equation and calculate Born probabilities from its solutions. 
 But the theory of decoherence can help to justify a decision to apply the Born Rule under 
conditions specified by the prepared description of an explanandum regularity. For one can appeal 
to that description in modeling the effect of environmental interactions on the target quantum 
systems the description takes to manifest the regularity, as a process by which the coherence of 
their quantum state is rapidly delocalized into the environment. If such decoherence selects a 
robust set of approximately orthogonal quantum states of target systems, where each of these states 
is correlated with a particular quantum state of the environment (or states of its subsystems), then 
expectations based on application of the Born Rule to the quantum state of the target systems will 
be reliably borne out. 
   In this section I have quickly sketched a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory 
outlined more fully elsewhere ([in press]) in order to show how contemporary quantum theory, so 
understood, evades Bell’s critique. I then showed in general terms how quantum theory helps us 
explain the kinds of regularities it is usually taken to explain: for a more complete discussion, with 
examples, see my ([forthcoming]). In the rest of this paper I focus on the explanation of 
“non-local” correlations, beginning with Bell’s seminal argument that any theory proposed as a 
candidate for explaining EPR-Bell correlations must violate a condition of local causality. 
  
4. The argument as to why candidate theories violate local causality 
Bell’s papers contain several formulations of his local causality condition, and arguments that the 
predictions of any theory meeting a condition so formulated must conform to an inequality 
violated in some cases by those of quantum theory. Perhaps his most careful formulations were in 
Bell [1990]. Norsen ([2009], [2011]) has sought further to clarify these arguments, and Seevinck 
and Uffink [2010] (SU) recently presented a persuasive reconstruction of Bell’s argument that no 
locally causal theory can account for the patterns of statistical correlation expected on the basis of 
quantum theory and now amply confirmed by experiments. SU follow Norsen in stressing that 
Bell’s condition of local causality is intended to apply to theories advanced as candidates for 
accounting for EPR-Bell correlations. 
 Bell’s ([1990], p.106) formulation is as follows: 
Local Causality A theory is said to be locally causal if the probabilities attached to values 
of local beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered by specification of 
values of local beables in a space-like separated region 2, when what 
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happens in the backward light cone of 1 is already sufficiently specified, for 
example by a full specification of all local beables in a space-time region 3. 
The regions 1-3 are as indicated in figure 1. 
 SU first argue that it is not appropriate here to require a full specification of all local 
beables in region 3, since that would fix the apparatus setting in a Bell experiment with outcome in 
region 1, while this must be regarded as a free variable in deriving a Bell inequality on the basis of 
local causality (see Bell [1990], p.109)). Instead, SU set out to make more precise the notion of 
sufficiency that is important in deriving a mathematically sharp and clean version of local 
causality from the condition as formulated (except for the misleading example). 
 They clarify this notion of sufficiency as a combination of functional and statistical 
sufficiency, rendering the label b and random variable B (respectively) redundant for predicting 
Pa,b(A|B,λ) — the probability a theory specifies for beable A representing the outcome recorded in 
region 1 given beables a,b representing the free choices of what the apparatus settings are in 
sub-regions of 1,2 respectively, conditional on outcome B in region 2 and beable specification λ in 
a region 3 which smoothly joins 3a to a similar slice 3b right across the backward light cone of 2 so 
as to screen off both 1 and 2 from the overlap of their backward light cones. (See figure 2.) This 
implies 
Pa,b(A|B,λ)=Pa(A|λ)          (5a) 
By symmetry, interchanging ‘1’ with ‘2’, ‘A’ with ‘B’ and ‘a’ with ‘b’ implies 
Pa,b(B|A,λ)=Pb(B|λ)          (5b) 
SU offer equations (5a) and (5b) as their mathematically sharp and clean (re)formulation of the 
condition of local causality. Together, these equations imply the condition 
Pa,b(A,B|λ) = Pa(A|λ)× Pb(B|λ)        (6) 
used to derive CHSH inequalities. Experimental evidence that these inequalities are violated just 
as quantum theory leads one to expect is then taken to disconfirm Bell’s intuitive principle stated 
in section 1 above, and to highlight his opinion that there is an essential conflict between any sharp 
formulation of quantum theory and relativity. 
 SU endorse Bell’s claim that orthodox quantum mechanics is not a locally causal theory, 
because it violates (6). In the Bell state Φ+, for example, the probability of recording a horizontally 
polarized photon in 1 depends on whether that polarization is recorded for the entangled photon in 
2, since these records are perfectly correlated. The argument is that orthodox quantum theory 
specifies no beables in region 3 sufficient to render these outcomes probabilistically independent, 
as (6) requires. EVI would imply that quantum theory specifies some beables in region 3 for a 
system in the Bell state Φ+:  the photon pair has a property associated with linear polarization, 
with respect to each axis in the relevant plane (either both along or both orthogonal, though 
determinately neither). But (6) fails even if one accepts EVI and takes λ to be specified by these 
properties. 
 In more detail, SU claim that orthodox quantum mechanics violates the statistical 
sufficiency conditions 
Pa,b(A|B,λ)=Pa,b(A|λ)          (7a)          Pa,b(B|A,λ)=Pa,b(B|λ)          (7b) 
while conforming to the functional sufficiency conditions 
   Pa,b(A|λ)=Pa(A|λ)             (8a)             Pa,b(B|λ)=Pb(B|λ)            (8b) 
Statistical sufficiency is a condition employed by statisticians in situations where considerations of 
locality and causality simply don’t arise. But in this application the failure of quantum theory to 
provide a specification of beables in region 3 such that the outcome B is always redundant for the 
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probability of determining outcome A (and similarly with ‘A’, ‘B’ interchanged) has clear 
connections to local causality, as SU’s analysis has shown. 
 SU interpret the failure of (5a), (5b) in any candidate theory compatible with the quantum 
mechanical predictions for violation of CHSH inequalities as establishing a violation of local 
causality: 
there seems to be only one option, namely that local causality is violated, i.e. there must be 
some non-local causation present in the candidate theory under study. (p.13) 
If quantum theory is a candidate theory, it would then follow that some non-local causation is 
present in quantum theory. In section 5 I will argue that quantum theory is not a candidate theory in 
this sense, and that quantum theory does not violate (5a), (5b) or (7a), (7b). These conclusions are 
directly connected. None of (5a), (5b) or (7a), (7b) are well-defined within quantum theory, 
precisely because it is not a candidate theory in the sense of Bell, Norsen and SU. Since they are 
not well-defined, they are not violated by quantum theory—but neither do they hold.  (5a) and 
(5b) are mathematically sharp and clean (re)formulations of local causality when applied to a class 
of theories. But since quantum theory lies outside that class we can draw no conclusions about 
non-local causation in quantum theory from the work of Bell, Norsen and SU. I shall return to that 
issue in section 7 only after showing in section 6 how quantum theory helps us explain “non-local” 
correlations. 
 
5. Quantum theory is not a candidate theory 
Bell himself was quite explicit that his condition of local causality was designed for application to 
physical theories rather than to the world. He had two reasons for focusing on theories. First, it is 
easier to explore the causal structure of a theory than of the world: 
I would insist here on the distinction between analyzing various physical theories, on the 
one hand, and philosophising about the unique real world on the other hand. In this matter 
of causality it is a great inconvenience that the real world is given to us once only. We 
cannot know what would have happened if something had been different. We cannot repeat 
an experiment changing just one variable...Physical theories are more amenable in this 
respect. We can calculate the consequences of changing free elements in a theory, be they 
only initial conditions, and so can explore the causal structure of the theory. 
 (Bell [2004], p.101) 
Secondly, even our best theories remain a resource for saying something useful and possibly even 
true about the world: we cannot simply assume some theory under study adequately captures the 
nature of reality. 
The beables of the theory are those elements which might correspond to elements of 
reality, to things which exist. Their existence does not depend on ‘observation’. Indeed 
observation and observers must be made out of beables. I use the term ‘beable’ rather than 
some more committed term like ‘being’ or ‘beer’ to recall the essentially tentative nature of 
any physical theory. Such a theory is at best a candidate for the description of nature. (Bell 
[2004], p.174) 
To conclude from observed violations of Bell inequalities that nature violates local causality one 
would need reasons to believe that some such candidate theory truly describes the world: Though 
if the class of candidate theories is wide enough to include any plausible contender, then even the 
conclusion that there must be some non-local causation in a candidate theory would provide a 
reason to believe the world is non-local. So it is important to enquire into the qualifications for 
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candidacy, and especially to ask whether any prima facie plausible contenders face premature 
disqualification. Bell’s critique notwithstanding, quantum theory does enjoy the benefits of 
incumbency as our currently most fundamental physical theory. But I shall argue that these do not 
suffice even to qualify it for candidacy in this rigged election. 
 The argument is very simple. It is central to the pragmatist interpretation sketched in 
section 3 that quantum theory itself neither contains nor implies any descriptive claim about a 
physical system—neither about the world nor about any part of it. In Bell’s terminology, quantum 
theory has no beables. What the theory does is to offer advice to an agent on the content and 
credibility of claims of the form QΔ(s). While such a claim is not part of quantum theory, an agent 
can certainly use it to describe system s. To see whether this makes Q a beable we need to look 
more closely at what Bell means by this term. 
 Bell introduced the term ‘beable’ in contrast to quantum theory’s ‘observable’: 
  
It is not easy to identify precisely which physical processes are to be given the status of 
“observations” and which are to be relegated to the limbo between one observation and 
another. So it could be hoped that some increase in precision might be possible by 
concentration on the beables, which can be described “in classical terms”, because they are 
there. The beables must include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental 
equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments. “Observables” must be 
made, somehow, out of beables. (Bell [2004], p.52) 
He distinguished a class of local beables: 
We will be particularly concerned with local beables, those which (unlike the total energy) 
can be assigned to some bounded space-time region. ... 
It is in terms of local beables that we can hope to formulate some notion of local causality. 
(Bell [2004], p. 53) 
And elsewhere: 
Now it may well be that there just are no local beables in the most serious theories. When 
space-time itself is “quantized”, as is generally held to be necessary, the concept of locality 
becomes very obscure. ... So all our considerations are restricted to that level of 
approximation to serious theories in which space-time can be regarded as given, and 
localization becomes meaningful. Even then, we are frustrated by the vagueness of 
contemporary quantum mechanics. You will hunt in vain in the text-books for the local 
beables of the theory. What you may find there are the so-called “local observables”. It is 
then implicit that the apparatus of “observation”, or better, of experimentation, and the 
experimental results, are real and localized. We will have to do as best we can with these 
rather ill-defined local beables, while hoping always for a more serious reformulation of 
quantum mechanics where the local beables are explicit and mathematical rather than 
implicit and vague. (Bell [1990], p.100) 
Note that while Bell here contemplates the possibility of a “serious” theory of non-local beables, 
he (literally!) does not take seriously the possibility of a theory with no beables. A theory with no 
beables would not be a serious theory for Bell—i.e. a serious candidate for the job of truly 
describing nature. Note also that he takes for granted that claims describing experimental 
apparatus and the results of experiments are claims about beables, and that such claims should be 
founded on claims about the beables of a serious theory in two senses. First, the description offered 
by a serious theory should be sufficiently complete to determine the truth or falsity of any 
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(sufficiently precise) description of the macroworld: and secondly, a serious theory should make 
deterministic or probabilistic claims that have testable implications for descriptions of the results 
of experiments. 
 So is Q a beable in a claim of the form QΔ(s), about which an agent applying quantum 
theory may be advised to form a credence? Certainly an agent could make a claim of that form, and 
in so doing describe s, whether s is macroscopic and observable or microscopic or otherwise 
unobservable. But there is reason to question whether this makes Q or “the settings of switches and 
knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments” beables. 
Bell took it that by assigning a (value of a) beable to an object one is simply assigning it an 
objective property: beables, he said, can be described “in classical terms”, because they are there. 
 Recall that, on the pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory sketched in section 3, the 
significance of a claim QΔ(s) varies with the circumstances to which it relates.4
 By modulating the content of a claim QΔ(s) attributing a value to a magnitude in this and 
other ways, quantum theory arguably deprives that magnitude of beable status. A beable was 
supposed to be something capable of corresponding to reality—such correspondence being what it 
takes to make a claim QΔ(s) true. But it is important to note that even if correspondence to reality is 
not its function, such a claim may still be accepted as true or false on the basis of observation and 
experiment, and so serve as evidence for (or against!) the quantum theory that advises an agent on 
its tenability.  
 Accordingly, a 
quantum state plays a second role by modulating the content of a claim QΔ(s) by modifying its 
inferential relations to other claims. If s is not the entire universe, then it is a subsystem of some 
larger system v=s⊕u. Even if a claim QΔ(s) is licensed at time t1 because of the extensive 
delocalization of coherence of the quantum state assigned to s into the environment including u, 
quantum theory itself does not exclude the possibility of this decoherence spontaneously 
relocalizing into a future quantum state of s at t2. One would ordinarily take it to follow from the 
claim QΔ(s) made at time t1 that in either s or its environment there must be traces at t2 of the 
“objective property” of s that Q had a value in Δ at t1. But even when an agent is both licensed by 
quantum theory and warranted by his experience to claim QΔ(s) at time t1, he must acknowledge 
the (remote) possibility that at t2 there will be absolutely no evidence that the value of Q on s lay in 
Δ at t1, either in his own memory or in physical traces anywhere in the universe. 
 Quantum theory is not a candidate theory, in Bell’s sense. It posits no beables itself, and it 
even goes some way toward depriving claims external to quantum theory and made in the familiar 
language of everyday affairs, including laboratory procedures, of beable status. Bell would not 
count quantum theory, so interpreted, as a serious theory. But why not? Quantum theory 
understood along the lines of section 3 gives us our best and only way of predicting and explaining 
a host of otherwise puzzling phenomena. In particular, by its help we can explain “non-local” 
correlations including violations of Bell inequalities as well as results of experiments performed 
on GHZ states. The next section shows how. 
   
6. How to use quantum theory locally to explain “non-local” correlations 
In understanding how quantum theory contributes to an explanation of “non-local” correlations it 
is important to recall that quantum states are relational on this interpretation. When agents 
(actually or potentially) occupy relevantly different physical situations they should assign different 
quantum states to one and the same system. Each of these different quantum states is perfectly 
objective, and all may be equally correct: a system does not have a unique quantum state. When 
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the Born Rule is used to calculate Born probabilities for suitably licensed claims of the form QΔ(s) 
concerning a system s in given circumstances, the relevant quantum state is that which pertains to 
the physical situation of an (actual or potential) agent to whom these probabilities offer 
authoritative advice on how to apportion degrees of belief concerning these claims in the agent’s 
situation. It follows that sometimes differently situated agents should adopt different degrees of 
belief in a single claim of the form QΔ(s) concerning a system s in given circumstances. The 
different Born probabilities advising these different degrees of belief will then be equally objective 
and equally correct. None of them gives the real objective chance of QΔ(s) in the circumstances in 
which s finds itself, for there is no such thing. 
 So quantum theory should not be thought of as the kind of stochastic theory that specifies a 
unique chance to each possible outcome of a process in circumstances where that outcome is 
objectively undetermined by what has come before (however that is understood in a relativistic 
world). This is an important additional reason why quantum theory is not a candidate theory in the 
sense discussed in section 5. I noted in that section a reason why one who accepts quantum theory 
thereby accepts that a non-quantum claim of the form QΔ(s) is not a straightforward statement 
about a local beable, in Bell’s sense. But there is a much stronger reason why an assignment of 
Born probability to such a claim is not a statement about a local beable: Born probabilities are 
certainly not local beables representing localized chances, if quantum theory is interpreted along 
the lines of section 3. Instead, they offer authoritative (different) advice to differently situated 
agents on what to expect, and thereby explain the statistical patterns each records.5
 Consider figure 3, which depicts space-like separated measurements by Alice and Bob in 
regions 1,2 respectively on a photon pair in the Bell state Φ+. At t1 each takes the polarization state 
of the l-r photon pair to be |Φ+>= 1/√2 ( |HH> + |VV>). At t2, after recording polarization B for r, 
Bob ascribes state |B> to l, and uses the Born Rule to calculate P(A)= |<A|B>|2 for Alice to record 
polarization of l along the a-axis. At t2, Alice ascribes state ρ = ½I to l, and uses the Born Rule to 
calculate P(A)= ½ that she will record polarization of l along the a-axis. Each wisely uses the 
calculated probability to guide his or her expectations as to the outcome of Alice’s measurement. 
The question as to which, if either, of these different probabilities gives the real “chance” of 
Alice’s outcome simply doesn’t arise even though neither Bob’s nor Alice’s Born probability is 
subjective. 
   
 To repeat, Born probabilities aren’t local beables representing localized chances: they offer 
authoritative (different) advice to differently situated agents on what to expect, and thereby 
explain the statistical patterns each records. Quantum theory does not prescribe a single 
probability for Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement outcome in 1(2), but probabilities tailored to the local 
physical situation of each of them. Quantum theory is simply not a candidate for application of 
Bell’s local causality condition, since (at a time such as t2) it does not specify unique probabilities 
attached to values of local beables in a space-time region.  
 With this in mind, look again at the equation (5a), one of the pair SU offer as their 
mathematically sharp and clean (re)formulation of the condition of local causality.  
Pa,b(A|B,λ)=Pa(A|λ)          (5a)        Pa,b(B|A,λ)=Pb(B|λ)          (5b) 
(Parallel considerations apply to (5b)). Bell and others understand each term flanking the equality 
sign in (5a) as purporting to represent a single local magnitude―the chance of A in region 1, 
conditional on the beables λ the theory specifies for region 3. But so understood, (5a) simply can’t 
be applied in quantum theory, since this theory denies there is any such magnitude. This is to 
reiterate the previous point that Bell’s local causality condition is inapplicable to quantum theory, 
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as interpreted in section 3. But there may seem to be a different way to understand (5a) as stating a 
condition that is applicable within quantum theory. 
 Assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob are correct to agree in assigning state |Φ+> 
to the photon pair in region 3 (see figure 2), and also that this may be regarded as quantum theory’s 
complete specification of beables in that region. The term Pa(A|λ) on the right of equation (5a) may 
then be taken to specify the Born probability assigned by Alice to a photon being recorded as 
passing her polarizer oriented along the a axis, relative to the situation at space-time location 
marked by an X and labeled Alice-at-t2 in figure 3 (or indeed relative to the situation at any 
space-time point in the backward light cone of 1). While the term Pa,b(A|B,λ) on the left of equation 
(5a) may then be taken to specify the Born probability assigned by Bob to a photon being recorded 
as passing Alice’s polarizer oriented along the a axis, relative to the situation at space-time 
location marked by an X and labeled Bob-at-t2 in figure 3 (or indeed relative to any space-time 
point in the forward light cone of 2).  
 Reinterpreted in this way, it is clear why (5a) could not hold in quantum theory: the 
probabilities it then equates are relative to different physical situations, such that agents in the 
relevant physical situations (would) have access to different information. At t2 Bob can know the 
outcome of his photon measurement, while Alice cannot. Similarly, the term Pb(B|λ) on the right 
of equation (5b) is then reinterpreted as the Born probability assigned by Bob to a photon being 
recorded as passing his polarizer oriented along the b axis, relative to the situation at space-time 
location marked by an X and labeled Bob-at-t1 in figure 3 (or indeed relative to the situation at any 
space-time point in the backward light cone of 2). The term Pa,b(B|A,λ) on the left of equation (5b) 
is then reinterpreted as the Born probability assigned by Alice to a photon being recorded as 
passing Bob’s polarizer oriented along the b axis, relative to the situation at space-time location 
marked by an X and labeled Alice-at-t3 in figure 3 (or indeed relative to any space-time point in the 
forward light cone of 1). At t3 Alice can know the outcome of her photon measurement, while Bob 
cannot.6
 However, even though Alice and Bob may well be correct to agree in assigning state |Φ+> 
to the photon pair in region 3, in quantum theory this does not constitute an assignment of beables 
to that region: quantum theory has no beables, as presently interpreted! Quantum theory helps an 
agent such as Alice or Bob explain EPR-Bell correlations not by exhibiting them as outcomes of a 
deterministic or stochastic process involving beables (local or non-local), but by showing that 
these correlations are just what the agent should have expected in the circumstances. The agent 
does not use quantum theory itself in specifying these circumstances, but appeals to the theory 
only after the specification has been given in non-quantum terms. Moreover, strictly speaking, the 
correlations themselves are neither predicted nor even described by quantum theory. Rather, the 
theory offers an agent good advice on what to expect them to be. 
 
 To use quantum theory to explain “non-local” correlations, an agent needs to assign a 
quantum state to some system or systems in order to decide whether to expect them to obtain. In 
the case considered so far in this section, what makes |Φ+> the correct state for Alice and Bob to 
assign to the photon pair they take to figure in the explanation of the EPR-Bell correlations 
displayed by their measurements of photon polarization? By now the relevant community of 
physicists shares a body of wisdom concerning the circumstances in which such a state may be 
produced and certified as such. Foremost among currently recognized techniques for producing 
such a Bell state is spontaneous parametric down conversion of laser light by a specially cut 
nonlinear crystal such as beta barium borate (BBO), followed by passage through suitable optical 
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devices such as frequency filters and polarization-transformers. To call the process spontaneous is 
to say that pairs appear at random intervals, presumably as a result of a stochastic process. 
 While quantum theory itself helps to explain at least some aspects of this process, its 
success in producing pairs in state |Φ+> may be independently certified by quantum state 
tomography. This involves measurements of just the kinds of “non-local” correlations that Alice 
and Bob want to explain with the help of quantum theory, thereby threatening an apparent 
circularity. But the threat can be countered in several ways. The state |Φ+> may be certified by 
measuring correlations between outcomes of measurements of circular polarization and linear 
polarization along just a few combinations of axes a,b, and then appealed to in the explanation of a 
potential infinity of correlations in other polarization measurements. With sufficient experience in 
setting up laboratory equipment, one can become confident even without performing quantum 
state tomography that one has indeed created a source of photon pairs in state |Φ+>. Note that in 
either case, the warrant for assigning state |Φ+> rests on evidence characterizing laboratory 
equipment and its output in non-quantum terms. The process of producing pairs in state |Φ+> may 
be considered analogous to a process of synthesizing a complex organic molecule. Here, too, 
initial synthesis may be very difficult, and independent proof of success hard to come by: but with 
widespread practical experience and technical improvements the process may become reliable and 
routine. 
 There are other ways for producing the state |Φ+> and other ways for Alice and Bob to 
warrant their shared belief that this is the state of a photon pair on which they intend to make 
polarization measurements. How do they then appeal to this state in explaining the correlations 
between their outcomes? Each of them can offer a two stage account. While the accounts coincide 
at the first stage, they differ at the second.  
 Application of the Born Rule to |Φ+> yields joint probabilities for claims ascribing linear 
polarization A (rather than A⊥) to l and B (rather than B⊥) to r if and only if such claims both have 
a sufficiently wide license. Prior to interaction with their respective detectors, no such claims are 
licensed sufficiently for application of the Born Rule. Interaction between the quantized modes of 
the electromagnetic field and the detectors rapidly delocalizes the coherence of the field 
polarization modes, thereby extending to any agent including Alice and Bob a wide license to 
claim some outcome is registered by a photon detector in each of 1, 2 placed to detect photons 
emerging with polarization either parallel or orthogonal to a,b respectively. This justifies each of 
Alice and Bob in applying the Born Rule prior to 1, 2 to calculate a joint probability distribution 
Pa,b,|Φ+>(A,B) for the four possible outcomes of detection, either parallel or orthogonal to a,b. This 
distribution applies to every coincident pair of detections in this state, so such joint detections are 
probabilistically independent. It follows that each of Alice and Bob should confidently expect that 
the relative frequencies of detection events in a long sequence will closely match these joint 
probabilities. So for Alice, Bob and any other hypothetical agent in a relevant physical situation, 
the EPR-Bell correlations displayed in these conditions are just what were to be expected on the 
basis of quantum theory. These correlations are thereby explained.7
 The explanation exhibits the dependence of these “non-local” correlations on all the 
non-quantum claims agents like Alice and Bob were each warranted in making before being in a 
position to certify the occurrence of the correlated events. In this sense it shows how this regularity 
is determined by the objective prior state of the world. But this dependence differs from causal 
determination in significant respects. It is indirect, in so far as it is mediated by a quantum state 
|Φ+> that does not have the function of ascribing properties to the photon pairs involved. Both that 
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state and the Born probabilities it yields are relational, depending on the physical situation of an 
agent ascribing that state (though the situations of agents like Alice and Bob at t1 lead them to 
ascribe the same state). Most strikingly, this dependence does not conform to (6) when λ is 
specified by all non-quantum claims agents like Alice and Bob were warranted in making before 
being in a position to certify the occurrence of the correlated events—i.e. claims about what 
happens to the past of a space-like hypersurface to the past of both 1 and 2. So this is not a 
dependence on a common cause in any familiar sense.8
 At t2 Bob can go on to offer an explanation of why Alice gets the outcome she does when 
measuring the polarization of the particular photon l paired with the photon r whose polarization 
he has recorded in 2. The case is particularly striking when the axes a,b coincide, since Bob is then 
in a position to explain why Alice’s outcome certainly matches his own: but an assignment of any 
specific probability has significant explanatory value. Bob’s application of the Born Rule to 
calculate the probabilities of Alice’s outcomes is warranted by decoherence at the detectors as 
before. But Bob is now in a position to assign quantum state |B> to l, since he has recorded 
outcome B in 2 and the quantum state assigned to the pair prior to 2 was |Φ+>. Bob is justified in 
“collapsing the wave” in this situation not because there has been any physical change in the 
quantum state—remember, on this interpretation a quantum state never physically changes since it 
does not represent the condition of any physical system. Nor does Bob’s replacement of |Φ+> by 
|B> reflect the fact that the polarization of l is B after 2—neither Bob nor anyone else was 
warranted in ascribing any determinate polarization to l at t2, since l undergoes delocalization of 
coherence only at Alice’s detector. Bob replaces |Φ+> by |B> simply as a way of updating his 
authoritative source of advice concerning matters about which his present physical situation 
prevents him from otherwise obtaining information. 
 Finally, even though they are objective, the 
non-quantum claims that warrant agents like Alice and Bob in assigning state |Φ+> are not exactly 
claims about beables, in Bell’s sense, as section 5 explained.  
 To reinforce this point notice that if Alice is moving uniformly toward Bob at a high 
enough speed 1 will occur earlier than 2 in her frame. In that case, she can offer an explanation of 
why Bob gets the outcome he does when measuring the polarization of the particular photon r 
paired with the photon l whose polarization she has recorded in 1. At t3, Alice is then in a position 
to assign quantum state |A> to r, since she has recorded outcome A in 1 and the quantum state 
assigned to the pair prior to 2 was |Φ+>. Alice’s replacement of |Φ+> by |A> in her situation then 
represents no physical collapse, and is perfectly consistent with Bob’s replacement of |Φ+> by |B> 
in his situation. 
 Notice that, in these circumstances, while Bob can explain Alice’s outcome by using 
quantum theory to show that it was just what he should have expected given his own outcome, 
Alice can explain Bob’s outcome by using quantum theory to show that it was just what she should 
have expected given her own outcome. Each explanation exhibits the dependence of the event 
explained on features of the situation described by NQMC’s. But the symmetry between Alice’s 
and Bob’s explanations makes it clear that this dependence seems asymmetric only when 
relativized to the situation of an actual or hypothetical agent. There is nothing here to suggest that 
the dependence is causal or metaphysical rather than epistemic in origin, a point that will be 
pursued in section 7.  
 One can get further insight into how an agent’s assignment of quantum states depends on 
the agent’s physical situation by reflecting on a scenario in which Alice’s measurement of 
a-polarization on l occurs time-like later than Bob’s measurement of b-polarization on r, as 
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depicted in figure 4. In region I of her world-line, Alice is space-like separated from Bob’s 
measurement of b-polarization on r, and so inevitably ignorant that its outcome is B. The 
objectively correct quantum state for Alice to assign to l is therefore ρ = ½I. But in region II of her 
world-line, Alice is in a position to obtain information about Bob’s outcome, whether or not she 
has the physical means to access that information. Consequently, the objectively correct quantum 
state for Alice in region II to assign to l is |B>, although if she then in fact has no information about 
Bob’s outcome, she should continue to assign l the mixed state ρ = ½I as a way of acknowledging 
that, given her actual information, Bob’s outcome could equally well have been B⊥. 
 Notice that Alice’s reassignment of quantum state to l does not occur at the time when she 
takes Bob’s measurement of b-polarization on r to occur, but later, as her world-line crosses into 
the forward light cone of that event. Notice also that this reassignment of quantum state to l reflects 
no physical event occurring either on Alice’s world-line or anywhere in the forward light cone of 
Bob’s measurement. Certainly it reflects no physical event involving l. This just reinforces the 
lesson that “wave collapse” is not a physical process. 
 The “non-local” correlations manifested by GHZ states are striking since the probabilities 
that figure in them are extremal, taking on values 0 or 1, so the correlations may be considered 
strict. Consider a scenario in which each of Alice, Bob and Charlie performs some polarization 
measurement on one of three photons in the entangled polarization state 
|GHZ> = 1/√2 ( |HHH> + |VVV>)          (9) 
Specifically, each has a choice to measure either whether that photon is left- or right-circularly 
polarized, or whether than photon is linearly polarized along or orthogonal to an axis H´ at 45̊ with 
respect to the original H axis. If any two of Alice, Bob and Charlie choose to measure circular 
polarization while the third chooses to measure linear polarization with respect to H´, then the 
Born Rule applied to state |GHZ> implies with probability 1 the following perfect correlation 
between their outcomes: if the circular polarization measurements agree, then the linear 
polarization measurement has outcome V´, while if they disagree then the linear polarization 
measurement has outcome H´. But if all three choose to measure linear polarization with respect to 
H´ then if any two of their outcomes agree the third outcome is sure to be H´, while if any two of 
their outcomes disagree then the third outcome is sure to be V´. In section 7 I examine the 
implications of these predictions, verified by Pan et.al. (2000), for locality. But how can one use 
quantum theory to explain them? 
 Suppose Alice has chosen to measure linear polarization and knows that both the others 
have chosen to measure circular polarization. Initially she assigns state |GHZ> to all three photons, 
and traces over her polarization space to assign completely mixed polarization state 1/4(I⊗I) to 
Bob and Charlie’s photon pair. After recording outcome H´ (say) she reassigns entangled state 
1/√2(|RL>+|LR>) to Bob and Charlie’s photon pair. She can now use this to explain the perfect 
anticorrelations between the outcomes of Bob’s and Charlie’s measurements. If she enters the 
forward light cone of Bob’s measurement event first, her correct assignment to the state of 
Charlie’s photon will be either |R> or |L>, depending on whether Bob’s outcome is L or R. Neither 
of these reassignments of quantum state reflects any change in the properties of Bob’s or Charlie’s 
photon pair or its elements. Each of Bob and Charlie has his own similar alternative reassignment 
of quantum states to the photon pair he does not measure, reflecting changes in his own space-time 
location and the information available to him from that location. The only physical events figuring 
in any of their accounts are the local polarization measurements on the three photons. Each can 
appeal to the outcome of his own measurement in using quantum theory to help explain the perfect 
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correlations between the outcomes of the other two measurements. 
 Notice that, depending on the outcome of her measurement, Alice can explain either the 
perfect anticorrelation between Bob and Charlie’s outcomes, or their perfect correlation. For if she 
had obtained outcome V´ she should instead reassign entangled state 1/ √2(|RR>+|LL>) to Bob and 
Charlie’s photon pair. Alice’s measurement does not produce either correlation or anticorrelation  
between Bob’s and Charlie’s photons. It just provides Alice with information relevant to 
understanding whether the outcomes of their measurements will be correlated or uncorrelated. 
Here as elsewhere assignment of an entangled quantum state to a compound system does not 
reflect any physical relation between its components. That is true of the GHZ state itself, which in 
the experiment of Pan et.al. (2000) was assigned on the basis of the outcome of a polarization 
measurement on a fourth “herald” photon produced from one of the two entangled pairs out of 
which the other three photons were selected after suitable optical processing.  
 
7. Counterfactuals, causation and locality 
“Non-local” correlations such as those displayed in EPR-Bell and GHZ scenarios are generally, 
though not universally, taken to support counterfactual claims.9
 If Bob were to measure linear polarization along x1 he would get outcome o. 
 The strict correlations predicted 
by applying the Born Rule to a Bell state such as |Φ+> provide a classic example of this. For any 
polarization axis x, if Alice and Bob each successfully measure the linear polarization with respect 
to x of a (different) photon in state |Φ+>, the outcomes of their measurements will agree (with 
probability 1). But in so far as performance of a polarization measurement on a photon with respect 
to axis x1 physically excludes simultaneous performance of a polarization measurement on that 
photon with respect to axis x2 (if x2 is neither parallel nor orthogonal to x1), Alice and Bob can each 
successfully measure the linear polarization of their photon in state |Φ+> along at most one axis. 
Suppose Alice measures linear polarization along x1 with outcome o. Then the perfect correlations 
predicted by state |Φ+> apparently warrant the following subjunctive conditional: 
If Bob is assumed not to measure linear polarization along x1 (whether or not he measures some 
other component of polarization—linear, circular or elliptical) this is a counterfactual conditional. 
The state |Φ+> further apparently warrants subjunctive conditionals with probabilistic 
consequents, such as 
If Bob were to measure linear polarization along an axis at 30º from x1 he would get 
outcome o with probability 3/4. 
Note that the warrant for such counterfactuals is independent of the space-time separation between 
events involved in Alice’s measurement and in Bob’s (hypothetical) measurement, including 
Alice’s choice of what polarization component to measure (along with its physical 
implementation) and the outcome of that measurement (if performed). In particular, Alice’s choice 
and outcome may be space-like separated from Bob’s choice and outcome. 
 Causal relations are intimately associated with counterfactual conditionals. Lewis ([1973], 
[1986]) offered an influential counterfactual analysis of causation. Butterfield [1992] argued that it 
is a consequence of this analysis that (if what measurement is performed at one wing has no effect 
on the outcome at the other wing then) outcomes at different wings of a Bell-EPR-type situation 
are directly causally connected, even when space-like separated. In a footnote he credited Clifton 
with strengthening this argument by considering the strict correlations that obtain in a GHZ 
scenario. Indeed, Clifton, Pagonis and Pitowsky (CPP) [1992] contains an argument that, 
according to Lewis, there is strict causal dependence (and therefore a direct causal relation) 
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between space-like separated events in that scenario.10
 Let ◯ denote a measurement of circular polarization with possible outcomes L and R, and 
let / denote a measurement of linear polarization with possible outcomes V´, H´. Then the 
following counterfactual is warranted by the strict GHZ correlations in state |GHZ>, where the 
first entry in the antecedent refers to Alice’s (counterfactual) measurement, the second to Bob’s, 
and the third to Charlie’s, and similarly for the outcomes of the measurements in each disjunct of 
the consequent: 
 I sketch this argument in terms of the strict 
GHZ correlations described in section 6. 
 {◯◯/}  □→ {(LLV ´) ∨ (RRV´) ∨ (LRH´) ∨ (RLH´)}          (10a) 
Here □→ symbolizes the subjunctive conditional if it were the case that....then it would be the case 
that and ∨ symbolizes exclusive or. Two other counterfactuals (10b), (10c) are similarly 
warranted: these result from (10a) by permuting the measurements (and corresponding possible 
outcomes) among Alice, Bob and Charlie. So too is this fourth counterfactual: 
{///}  □→ {(V ´V´H´) ∨ (H´H´H´) ∨ (V´H´V´) ∨ (H´V´V´)}          (10d) 
Now let λ specify beables in a region constituting a space-like slice right across the backward light 
cones of Alice, Bob and Charlie’s (counterfactual) measurement events that screens these all off 
from the overlap of their backward light cones. Consistent with (10a) we must have 
 {◯◯/λ}  □→ {(LLV ´) ∨ (RRV´) ∨ (LRH´) ∨ (RLH´)}          (11a) 
and so (from the first and fourth disjuncts) 
 {◯◯/λ}&{LaLb}     □→V ´c          (12ai) 
  {◯◯/λ}&{RaLb}    □→H ´c          (12aii) 
provided that the antecedent of each of these two counterfactuals holds in some physically possible 
world. But (12ai), (12aii) imply Lewisian strict causal dependence between Alice’s outcome and 
Charlie’s outcome, even if their measurements are space-like separated. If there is no such 
dependence, then at most one of equations (12a) has an antecedent that holds in some possible 
world. That in turn implies that at most one of the combinations {Lb, V´c}, {Lb, H´c} can be 
compatible with {◯◯/λ}. Similar arguments based on the other five pairs of disjuncts of (11a) 
rule out other possible combinations of pairs of outcomes for two of the three measurements, 
consistent with {◯◯/λ}. So if there is no Lewisian causal dependence between outcomes for a 
particular λ, then that λ uniquely determines the outcomes of all three measurements {◯◯/} in 
the GHZ state. Parallel arguments establish a similar conclusion based on each of the 
counterfactuals (11b)-(11d) that result from (10b)-(10d) by further specifying λ in the same way 
that (11a) resulted from (10a). So if there is no strict causal dependence between outcomes of 
Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s measurements, then those outcomes are determined by λ (with 
probability 1) in the GHZ state. Notice that the argument did not assume such determinism by λ, 
but proved it from a locality assumption (the absence of Lewisian strict causal dependence 
between outcomes for each particular λ). Notice also that the argument did not assume the 
following EPR sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity—a condition that has 
sometimes been identified with realism: 
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with 
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there is an element of 
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. (EPR [1935], p.777) 
 
 Having used the GHZ correlations to establish determinism of measurement outcomes by 
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λ, CPP’s argument continues by using this to establish Lewisian causal dependence between 
measurement settings and distant outcomes. The first step is to show that if there is no such causal 
dependence then what the outcome of any of Alice, Bob or Charlie’s polarization measurement is 
determined by λ to be cannot depend on what measurements the other two perform, on a given 
triple of photons. Now associate value +1(−1) with outcome R(L) of a circular polarization 
measurement, and value +1(−1) with outcome V´(H´) of a linear polarization measurement in the 
GHZ scenario. Then (10a)-(10c) imply that the product of the values associated with two circular 
polarization measurements and one linear polarization measurement is always +1, while (10d) 
implies that the product of the values associated with three linear polarization measurements is 
always −1. There is no assignment of predetermined outcomes to all these possible combinations 
of measurements compatible with these values. So no matter what λ may be, and no matter how it 
determines the outcomes of Alice, Bob and Charlie’s measurements, no value of λ is compatible 
with the GHZ correlations predicted by quantum theory and now experimentally confirmed unless 
there is Lewisian causal dependence—either between some measurement setting and the outcome 
of a distant measurement, or between the outcomes of distant measurements. 
 When CPP come to consider how their argument bears on quantum theory, they conclude 
that it is determinism that fails, and so there is Lewisian strict causal dependence between distant 
outcomes in the GHZ scenario. They do not see this as raising an objection to Lewis’s analysis, 
since such causal dependence cannot be used to construct tachyon-like “causal” paradoxes. 
Indeed, in their view Lewis’s analysis is helpful in explicating the idea of peaceful coexistence 
between quantum theory and special relativity. It is worth noting that their discussion assumes that 
in quantum theory the GHZ state itself functions as a variable λ—an assumption rejected by the 
present pragmatist interpretation of that theory. But their sanguine endorsement of the view that 
GHZ correlations manifest superluminal causation should be rejected for a more important reason: 
The counterfactual connections between space-like separated events here are epistemic rather than 
causal―a position I shall defend after considering another attempt to use such counterfactual 
connections to argue for superluminal causation.  
 Without advancing a counterfactual theory of causation, Maudlin ([2011], p.118) defended 
a sufficient condition for causal connection of distinct events modeled on Bell’s local causality 
condition.  
...given a pair of space-like separated events A and B, if A would not have occurred had B 
not occurred even though everything in A’s past light cone was the same then there must be 
superluminal influences. 
He applies this to an ideal experiment in which Alice and Bob have set their polarizers along the 
same axis a in the Bell state |Φ+> and their detectors record the same photon polarizations in 
space-like separated events A, B. Maudlin first argues that the antecedent of his sufficient 
condition is met by the events A, B, then applies this condition to conclude that there are causal 
connections between space-like separated events here—either directly between A and B or 
between at least one of these events and some common cause C that lies outside the overlap of their 
backward light cones. I shall argue that Maudlin’s sufficient condition is incorrect. But first I 
question his argument seeking to establish the truth of its antecedent. 
 The statement A would not have occurred had B not occurred even though everything in 
A’s past light cone was the same is a counterfactual. Maudlin wishes to show that it is true. While 
acknowledging the difficulties often encountered in evaluating counterfactuals, Maudlin claims 
that these can be overcome in certain scientific contexts: 
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Counterfactual claims can be implied by laws if the antecedent of the conditional is 
precisely enough specified. ([2011], p.120) 
To use this to see if the key counterfactual used to formulate his sufficient condition for causal 
connection holds for quantum theory, it is then necessary to specify the laws of that theory. 
Maudlin takes the Schrödinger equation to be one such law stating how physical magnitudes will, 
or could, evolve through time. But the Schrödinger equation alone does not imply the relevant 
counterfactual: moreover, the present interpretation of quantum theory denies that it states how 
physical magnitudes will, or could, evolve through time. As Maudlin’s discussion ([2011], 
pp.123-7) makes clear, the law that supposedly implies the key counterfactual can only be a 
stochastic law governing wave-collapse. Indeed, Maudlin’s target in this whole argument is a 
common understanding of quantum theory, on which definite measurement outcomes are secured 
not by hidden variables but through a stochastic process grounding physical wave-collapse. 
 But, with no mention of hidden variables, the interpretation outlined in section 3 denies 
that quantum probabilities arise from the playing out of any such stochastic process. As presently 
interpreted, quantum theory involves no stochastic law governing wave-collapse: a quantum state 
does not describe a quantum system, and so an agent’s reassignment of quantum state on gaining 
new information represents no physical change in a quantum system. So one cannot use laws of  
quantum theory to establish the truth of the counterfactual in the antecedent of Maudlin’s 
sufficient condition. 
  Despite this failure, an agent like Bob-at-t2 (in figure 3) who accepts quantum theory has 
good reason to endorse the counterfactual claim (B) in the case a=b. 
 If the outcome of Bob’s measurement had been different then the outcome of Alice’s    
(B)  measurement would have been different, even though everything in the past light cone of               
 1 was the same. 
For Bob is licensed to use state |Φ+> in the Born Rule to calculate the probabilities of Alice’s two 
possible outcomes, conditional on his having obtained a different outcome. On the basis of that 
calculation Bob is wholly warranted in believing the counterfactual claim (B). Similarly, 
Alice-at-t3 is wholly warranted in believing (A). 
 If the outcome of Alice’s measurement had been different then the outcome of Bob’s    
(A)  measurement would have been different, even though everything in the past light cone of               
 2 was the same. 
In this sense, Maudlin’s sufficient condition for causal connection can be applied to quantum 
theory, though not on the basis of laws of that theory governing the evolution of any physical 
process. However it does not follow that the condition is correct, as so applied. I shall argue that it 
is not correct, as so applied. The counterfactual A would not have occurred had B not occurred 
even though everything in A’s past light cone was the same is important to a situated agent not 
because it establishes a causal relation between space-like separated events, but because it 
establishes an epistemic link between them. 
  How does it serve Alice’s and Bob’s purposes to endorse the claims (A), (B) respectively? 
More generally, what role do counterfactuals play in an agent’s practical reasoning? Since an agent 
can act only in the actual world, it is not immediately obvious why she should be concerned with 
counterfactual possibilities. The basic reason is that no agent can have complete information about 
the world in a situation in which she is deciding what to do. Since she must act on the basis of 
incomplete information it is important for her to consider different ways the world could be, 
consistent with whatever information she takes herself to have. It is also important for her to make 
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the best use of the information available to her through theoretical reasoning. Such reasoning may 
be based on assumptions of which she is sure; it may be merely hypothetical—depending on 
assumptions she is not in a position currently to evaluate; or it may be based on alternative 
assumptions, any one of which she considers within her power to make true by her own free action. 
 This last use of theoretical reasoning provides one important role for counterfactuals in 
practical reasoning. In deciding what to do an agent needs to trace out the possible consequences of 
her alternative actions in order to evaluate them, as well as their relative probabilities. Therefore 
associated with each alternative possible action there is a variety of subjunctive conditionals 
concerning its possible consequences and some estimate of the probability of each consequence. 
Since only one alternative action can occur, most of these will have false antecedents, and be in 
this sense counterfactual. This is the home territory of causal counterfactuals. An agent needs 
causal knowledge in order to trace out the consequences of each of her alternative actions, and that 
is just what causal counterfactuals supply her with. Recent authors have noted how the advance of 
science has extended the use of causal counterfactuals far beyond this home territory to any 
situation in which it makes sense to speak of an intervention in the behavior of some system, where 
such intervention need not be the direct result of an agent’s action.11 Accordingly, if it does not 
make sense to speak of an intervention in a system capable of making the antecedent of a 
counterfactual conditional true, then this is not a causal counterfactual.12
 How could one try to make sense of this idea? Certainly no alternative action of Alice or 
Bob could make one of these true without disrupting the system involved in the EPR-Bell scenario 
itself (e.g. by preparing a different quantum state). In particular, choosing to measure a different 
polarization component would not have this effect. Quantum theory itself provides no resources on 
which one can draw to make sense of an intervention capable of changing the outcome of Alice’s 
or Bob’s measurement of a fixed component of polarization. 
 I shall argue that one 
cannot make sense of an intervention that secures the truth of the antecedent of (A) or of (B). 
 In his sophisticated discussion of what the possibility of intervention requires, Woodward 
([2003], pp. 130-3) argues that an intervention must be conceptually possible, though it need not 
be physically possible. He considers a case in which an event C that is a potential locus of 
intervention occurs spontaneously in the sense that it has no causes. He argues that even in this 
case one can make sense of an intervention on C. This suggests that one can still make sense of the 
idea that an intervention in the EPR-Bell scenario is capable of making true the antecedent of (A) 
or of (B) in the case under consideration. But if one examines the conditions he imposes on an 
intervention it turns out that these cannot all be met here. 
 Woodward ([2003], p. 98) states necessary and sufficient conditions for I to be an 
intervention variable for X with respect to Y. These include 
 I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, certain values of I 
(I2) are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend on the values of other 
 variables that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I. 
Let X be a variable with values 0,1 according as Bob gets outcome A, A⊥ respectively, and Y be a 
variable with values 0,1 according as Alice gets outcome A, A⊥ respectively for their space-like 
separated measurements of polarization along axis a in state |Φ+>: and let J be some hypothetical 
intervention variable for X with respect to Y here. The counterfactual conditional (B) holds (at least 
for Bob-at-t2), and we are assuming that J is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y. So we 
may conclude that the value of X causes the corresponding value of Y. By parallel reasoning 
applied to (A) we may conclude that Y causes the corresponding value of X. But this is now in 
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contradiction to (I2). By reductio ad absurdum, J is not an intervention variable for X with respect 
to Y. But J was arbitrary. Hence there can be no intervention variable for X with respect to Y.  
Therefore the counterfactuals (A), (B) are not causal. Maudlin’s sufficient condition for a causal 
connection is not correct, as applied to Alice and Bob’s outcomes in this case. 
  The preceding argument depended on a particular implementation of the thought that a 
causal connection provides a potential means of manipulating an event by intervening on its 
causes. There are those who will continue to reject either the thought or its implementation, 
perhaps because of a commitment to a metaphysical view according to which  
...causality consist in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the 
common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come 
of, their causes. (Anscombe [1971]) 
Their alternative thought may be that effects simply emerge from their causes as the world 
evolves, whether or not we choose to regard some of these events as potential loci of intervention, 
by agents or anything else. It is clear that quantum theory does not encourage this thought, as 
presently interpreted. But since it does still give agents a reason to endorse counterfactuals like (A) 
and (B), what can be their function, if not to point to causal connections in nature? 
 To begin to answer this question, return to the information-maximizing role of 
counterfactual claims in an agent’s theoretical reasoning. An agent is often not sure whether some 
event e occurs (read tenselessly), and is presently in a position neither to find out whether it occurs 
nor to bring about its occurrence. But if that event does occur, then her present information may 
permit her to infer (or estimate the probability) that some other events about which she is equally 
ignorant occur. So to maximize the value of the information she has in anticipating how that 
information may grow or change, she needs to indulge in hypothetical reasoning based on the 
assumption of e’s occurrence. If she is not sure which of a range of strictly alternative events {ei} 
occurs, permitting inferences to incompatible conclusions about the occurrence of other events 
(say {fi} ), then the permitted inferences may be cast in the form of subjunctive conditionals ei □→ 
fi, all but one of which have false antecedents. 
  Bob-at-t1 is in just this position. Suppose he knows that Alice measures a-polarization of 
one photon of a pair in state |Φ+> at 1, and intends to measure a-polarization of the other photon at 
2. Although he is then inevitably ignorant of the outcomes of both measurements, he can use 
quantum theory to form the firm expectation that they will be the same, and express this 
conclusion in the form of two subjunctive conditionals: 
If my outcome were to be A, then Alice’s outcome would be A.   
 If my outcome were to be A⊥ then Alice’s outcome would be A⊥. 
Together these subjunctive conditionals permit him to infer that, whatever his actual outcome, had  
that outcome been different then the outcome of Alice’s measurement would have been different, 
even though everything in the past light cone of 1 was the same, which is (B). 
 This does not provide (B) with a direct role in enhancing Bob’s information: at best, it 
helps shape his attitudes at t2 or later toward events about which he is already fully informed. (B) 
may be considered a by-product of the subjunctive conditionals highlighted in the previous 
paragraph, and these did have a direct role in enhancing Bob’s conditional information at t1 
concerning events at 1. Viewed in this light, (B) serves to diagnose informational utility rather than 
to provide it. Causal counterfactuals are similarly diagnostic. It does not help to know that if I had 
not turned the key the engine would not have started if this gives me no reason to think that were I 
to turn the key the engine would start. While (B) is a symptom of Bob’s potential for informational 
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enrichment, (A) but not (B) is a similar symptom for Alice. Different subjunctive conditionals are 
epistemically useful to Alice and Bob because each has access to different information, given their 
different physical (specifically spatiotemporal) situations. 
 To sum up, what Maudlin presents as a sufficient condition for superluminal causal 
influence is not that at all, but rather a condition for diagnosing valuable epistemic links between 
space-like separated events revealed by quantum theory. 
 While conditionals such as (A), (B), (10) mark dependence relations between events at 
separate space-time locations, this dependence is not causal. These subjunctive conditionals serve 
to mark the dependable nature of the correlations to which they correspond that enables them to 
serve the epistemic purposes of localized agents. Quantum-endorsed counterfactuals are not 
evidence of agent-independent causal connections in nature: they are symptoms of informational 
resources available to physically situated agents in our world. The next section shows how the 
quantum states and probabilities that support them are ideally suited to meet the informational 
needs of physically situated agents in a relativistic world. 
   
8. Counterfactuals, information and chance in a relativistic world 
Having shown to his own satisfaction that the predictions of any “serious candidate theory” 
obeying his condition of local causality are in conflict with experimentally confirmed predictions 
of quantum theory, Bell took this as a symptom of a serious problem for quantum theory itself. 
For me then this is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently essential conflict 
between any sharp formulation and fundamental relativity. That is to say, we have an 
apparent incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars of 
contemporary theory... ([2004], p. 172.)  
His fellow travelers have endorsed this opinion (Maudlin [2011], Norsen [2011], Seevinck [2010]) 
even while some have expressed hope for a solution in work such as that of Tumulka ([2006], 
[2009]). 
 I shall argue against this consensus that, when interpreted along the lines of section 3, 
quantum theory fits comfortably within relativistic space-time. Indeed, quantum probabilities and 
the informational resources they bring are wonderfully adapted to enable agents situated in 
relativistic space-time to exploit the possibilities inherent in the light cone structure that is so 
central to relativity. 
  How can an agent localized in space-time obtain information about what is happening 
elsewhere? There are two obvious methods open to her, on the assumption that no physical process 
propagates superluminally. She can perform observations and experiments that access information 
in her backward light cone via physical processes capable of conveying information to her from 
her (absolute) past: if she is patient, she can wait for more such information to become accessible 
to her as her world-line extends into her future. Or she can seek knowledge in intention of future 
events by acting so as make things happen in her forward light cone. Neither method is 
infallible—but no pragmatist would expect infallibility. 
 There are also less obvious methods. She can extrapolate robust regularities (“laws of 
nature”) evidenced locally to regions of space-time, even outside her light cone, as cosmologists 
do when drawing reasonable conclusions about happenings outside our particle horizon. More 
familiarly, she can appeal to correlations between joint effects of a common cause in her backward 
light cone, at least one of which is locally accessible, to make reasonable inferences to distant 
events—again including those outside her light cone. For example, two agents Alice and Bob can 
 26 
meet somewhere on earth and agree both to eat chocolate ice cream at some future time t if the 
random number each receives a minute earlier broadcast from a radio transmitter on a satellite 
orbiting Venus is even, but strawberry if it is odd. Bob travels sedately to Mars, which is in 
conjunction to the sun at the appointed hour. If all goes well, Alice knows what flavor of ice cream 
Bob eats on Mars at space-like separation from her at t. 
 As is now well known to quantum information theorists, “non-local” quantum correlations 
permit wholly novel methods of acquiring and sharing information. Here is an example to be used 
to illustrate points to come, based on the correlations inherent in the GHZ state (cf. Ghirardi 
[2005]). Alice, Bob and Charlie are set a coordination task, to be undertaken when each is at a 
location space-like separated from the others. When together beforehand, they are told that a fair 
coin will be tossed at each location, after which each will be asked to write down either the number 
+1 or the number −1. Their job is to devise a strategy and to implement it to ensure that 
(i) If all coins land heads, then the product of the numbers they have written down is −1.  
(ii)If exactly one coin lands heads, then the product of the numbers they have written down is +1. 
(What happens in the other four possible combinations of outcomes of coin tosses doesn’t matter.) 
Assuming no superluminal communication, none of them can know either the outcome of the 
others’ coin tosses or what they have written down before writing down his or her own number. 
 Any strategy they devise before separating that relies at most on correlations predictable 
within classical physics (with no superluminal physical processes) can be modeled as a choice of 
the variable λ in the argument of CPP sketched in the last section. That argument is readily adapted 
to show that Alice, Bob and Charlie have no successful strategy of that kind. But the “non-local” 
correlations predicted in quantum theory by application of the Born Rule to the GHZ state do make 
available a successful strategy. Each of A, B, C should measure a polarization component of his or 
her photon from a GHZ state they jointly prepared before separating. If his or her coin landed 
heads, this should be linear polarization along /, and he or she should write down +1 if the photon 
is found to be polarized along that direction, otherwise −1. If his or her coin landed heads, this 
should be circular polarization, and he or she should write down +1 if the photon is found to be 
right-circularly polarized, otherwise −1. Setting aside practical implementation problems, 
quantum theory assures each of them that this strategy will (with probability 1) succeed. 
 The GHZ correlations do not tell Alice (say) either how Bob’s and Charlie’s coins land or 
what number either of them writes down, even given the outcomes of her own coin toss and chosen 
polarization measurement. But knowledge of the strategy based on them does supply her with 
conditional information about what happens at Bob and Charlie’s locations. If her coin lands heads 
and she finds her photon polarized along axis /, then she can infer that, were Bob and Charlie’s 
coins both to land heads, then one of them (she can’t say which) would write down +1 while the 
other would write down −1: while if both of Bob and Charlie’s coins were to land tails then they 
would each write down the same number (she can’t say whether this is +1 or −1). If, on the other 
hand, she finds her photon polarized orthogonal to axis / then she can infer that, if Bob and 
Charlie’s coins were to land heads, then they would write down the same number: while if  both 
of Bob and Charlie’s coins were to land tails then one of them (she can’t say which) would write 
down +1 while the other would write down −1. 
 Such conditional information is just what each player needs to be sure their strategy will 
succeed. It is subjunctive conditionals endorsed by quantum theory (such as (10)) that supply them 
with this information. That is how the “non-local” correlations predicted by quantum theory 
enhance the informational resources available to agents who accept it in a way that has no parallel 
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in classical physics. The enhancement depends on endorsement of the subjunctive conditionals 
supported by those correlations. That is why it is important for agents using quantum theory to 
accept these conditionals, and the counterfactual conditionals (formed by denying their 
antecedents) that are diagnostic for them. 
 Notice that nothing about the application of GHZ correlations in the three preceding 
paragraphs depended on the space-time intervals separating A,B,C as each implements the 
successful strategy. The subjunctive conditionals on which its success depends, and the Born 
probabilities that underlie them, are insensitive to where in space-time each is when implementing 
the strategy. So while the success of the strategy when these intervals are all space-like cannot be 
emulated classically, the informational resources inherent in quantum correlations such as these 
can be deployed to advantage in situations where a classical emulation is available. Here are two 
further examples. 
 The Bell state |Φ+> predicts perfect (probability1) correlations for a measurement of H/V 
linear polarization on each of two photons by Alice and Bob irrespective of the space-time interval 
separating them. Knowing the outcome of her own polarization measurement, Alice can use one of 
two subjunctive conditionals to infer the outcome of Bob’s polarization measurement. 
 If A’s outcome were to be H, then B’s outcome would be H. 
 If A’s outcome were to be V, then B’s outcome would be V. 
If their measurements are space-like separated (as in figure 3), these outcomes do not result from a 
common cause λ in the overlap of their backward light cones satisfying equations (5a), (5b). 
Suppose that Alice and Bob had wished to arrange beforehand secretly to coordinate their 
activities in regions 1,2 respectively. They could have done so by means of a classical process 
serving as a common cause of events in those regions simply by carrying shared private 
instructions to 1, 2 respectively. But then information about events in region 2 would have been 
available in the backward light cone of 1 (as also of 2) to serve as the source of Alice’s knowledge 
about region 2. However, if they arrange each to measure H/V polarization on state |Φ+>, they can 
coordinate their activities in 1, 2 while leaving nothing in the backward light cone of 1 or 2 to serve 
as a source of information to a potential “spy” as to what they will do. In this way, quantum 
correlations permit an agent to acquire essentially private information about happenings space-like 
separated from her. This is just one simple example of the rich cryptographic potential inherent in 
subjunctive conditionals endorsed by quantum theory. 
 Now consider the entanglement-swapping scenario depicted in figure 5 in which the 
polarizations of all four photons in two entangled photon pairs, each independently prepared in 
Bell state |Ψ−>  = 1/√2 ( |HV > − |VH >), are measured in a four -fold coincidence.13
 In the former case, he can apply quantum theory to his outcomes to generate subjunctive 
conditionals (some strict, others probabilistic) concerning the outcomes of whatever polarization 
components Alice and Bob should choose to measure. No classical process within his light cone 
could provide him with this information. 
 When the 
Bell-state analyzer is switched to the appropriate setting, Victor measures the polarization of any 
photons emerging to the left and right of the beam splitter on which photons 2 and 3 are 
simultaneously incident. If he wishes to use quantum theory to guide his expectations as to the 
outcomes of Alice’s and Bob’s polarization measurements, then what entangled polarization state 
he should assign to the composite system composed of photons 1 and 4 prior to detection depends 
on the outcomes of his own measurements, which may be arranged either to be space-like 
separated from Alice and Bob’s measurements or to lie in the overlap of their forward light cones. 
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 However, in case Alice and Bob’s measurements occur in Victor’s backward light cone, 
then of course there are subluminal classical processes that Victor might be able to exploit to fully 
inform himself of Alice and Bob’s measurements and their outcomes. But Victor can avail himself 
of these only if the necessary physical connections are actually in place. There are important 
lessons here for the nature of quantum states and chances in a relativistic world. 
 Suppose that in an ideal experiment of this form Alice and Bob each measure the 
polarization of their photon using a highly efficient birefringent crystal with a detector in only one 
output channel. In these circumstances, failure to detect a photon indicates presence of a photon in 
the other channel. If suitable processes occur within Victor’s backward light cone, then with 
careful timing he can use them to inform himself of cases in which both Alice and Bob have failed 
to detect photons in coincidence with the two photons he has detected. Suppose that in one such 
case Victor applies quantum theory to his own outcomes to assign some entangled polarization 
state to the composite system composed of photons 1 and 4 immediately before Alice and Bob’s 
measurements. That quantum state does not represent any intrinsic property of either photon, or 
even of the pair as a whole: as presently understood, a quantum state never represents an intrinsic 
property of a system to which it is ascribed. But nor, in this situation does it represent Victor’s best 
source of advice on what to believe about Alice and Bob’s measurements on photons 1 and 4 or 
their outcomes—he already knows all about that. So Born probabilities calculated from this 
entangled polarization state are “trumped” as a guide to Victor’s expectations by the extremal (0 or 
1) probabilities delivered through his classical channels. 
 If Victor is physically situated so that he actually has access to reliable information about 
Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes through channels provided by processes within his 
backward light cone, then he should use that information to guide his beliefs about these outcomes 
rather than relying on Born probabilities derived from the entangled polarization state he 
justifiably assigns to 1+4 after consulting the outcomes of his own polarization measurements. 
Moreover, he should then assign each of 1 and 4 after Alice and Bob’s measurements 
(respectively) the eigenstate of linear polarization associated with the channel with no detector in it 
after emerging from their respective birefringent crystals. 
 Consider what this means for objective chance in quantum theory. The motivating idea 
behind Lewis’s [1980] Principal Principle connecting credence to objective chance was that 
objective chance should be understood as the “ideal” credence an agent should adopt, given all 
admissible information. But, as he stated it, the Principle indexes chance to (absolute) time, as 
follows: 
 Let C be any initially reasonable credence function. Let t be any time. Let x be any real 
(PP) number in the unit interval. Let X be the proposition that the chance, at time t, of A’s                                         
 holding equals x. Let E be any proposition compatible with X that is admissible at time t.                
 Then C(A|XE)=x. ([1986], p.87) 
Subsequent critical discussion focused on what propositions should be considered admissible, and 
why. Lewis’s indexing admissibility to time makes his principle ill-adapted to a relativistic 
space-time structure. But suppose one modifies the principle as follows: 
 Let C be any initially reasonable credence function. Let p be any space-time location of a 
(MPP) physically situated agent. Let x be any real number in the unit interval. Let X be the                         
 proposition that the chance, at p, of A’s holding equals x. Let E be any proposition                          
 compatible with X that is admissible at p. Then C(A|XE)=x. 
Here is one natural way to understand admissibility in this context: A proposition is admissible at p 
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just in case it is a consequence of whatever has happened in the backward light cone of p and what 
this implies for happenings outside p’s backward light cone. With this modification, one can ask: 
Can Born probabilities be understood as modified Lewisian chances? 
  Quantum theory is a fallible product of our scientific efforts. If one thinks of chance as an 
objective feature of the world, then to specify a Born probability is at best to attempt correctly to 
state a chance. From another perspective, chance constitutes an ideal credence at which an agent 
should aim when using all available information, including her best scientific theories. In the light 
of relativity, we (accepting relativity) may take an agent physically situated at p ideally to have 
available complete information as to what has happened in the backward light cone of p, together 
with whatever she may infer from this using quantum theory (which we take it she should accept) 
together with the rest of our science. Knowing everything about the contents of her backward light 
cone, she may be supposed to have information sufficient to assign quantum states to various 
systems, and to use these assignments to calculate Born probabilities for actual and merely 
hypothetical measurement outcomes. We suppose that sometimes such assignments give an 
agent’s ideal credences at p. Alice–at–t2's Born probabilities in figure 3 are her ideal credences 
concerning the outcome of her measurement in region 1, or so we believe, while Bob–at–t2's Born 
probabilities are his ideal credences concerning the outcome of Alice’s measurement in region 1. 
We believe this because we believe Alice–at–t2 and Bob–at–t2 have each made the best possible 
use of all information available to them in assigning their respective credences, even though these 
differ. So we may take these different Born probabilities as chances subject to (MPP). Then it 
becomes clear why Bell’s local causality condition is not appropriately applied to theories that 
specify objective chances in a relativistic world. 
 The case is different for Victor in figure 5. Suppose Victor assigns an entangled 
polarization state to 1+4 in the light of his own polarization measurements and uses this to 
calculate Born probabilities for Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes, both in his own 
backward light cone. As a practical matter, this may give him his best way of assigning credences 
to these various outcomes (perhaps in combination with the credences he attaches to each different 
measurement he supposes Alice and Bob may have made). But ideally he has available to him 
complete information about what has happened in his backward light cone, and this would enable 
him to assign credence 0 or 1 to Alice and Bob’s outcomes. Victor’s Born probabilities for Alice 
and Bob’s measurement outcomes do not correspond to his ideal credences in this case, so these 
Born probabilities are not objective chances subject to (MPP)—or so we believe. 
 
9. Conclusion 
It is time to remove the scare quotes around the word ‘non-local’ in the title of this paper by saying 
in what sense patterns of statistical correlation among distant events, first predicted using quantum 
theory and now amply confirmed by experiment, count as non-local. 
 The correlations that display these patterns are not localized when they are manifested by 
sets of distinct-event n-tuples (n=2,3, ...) in which at least two distinct events occur at different 
locations. This could happen in one of two ways. While space-like (or null) separated events occur 
at different locations in all reference frames, time-like separated events may occur at different 
locations in some salient reference frame (e.g. that of the laboratory). The mere occurrence of 
patterns of non-localized correlations has no implications for causation or for relativity theory. To 
derive such implications it is necessary to assume some theoretical explanation of the observed 
patterns. But whether that proves sufficient will depend on the theory, and on how it helps one 
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explain these patterns. 
 Bell used an intuitive principle of local causality to motivate the imposition of a local 
causality condition on any theory of a certain form, advanced as offering the possibility of 
explaining patterns of non-localized correlations successfully predicted by quantum theory. Any 
theory of that form is able sufficiently to represent the contents of the backward light cone of a 
region 1 in which an event in an n-tuple may occur by values taken there by magnitudes he calls 
local beables—sufficient, that is, to determine a unique probability attached to values of 
magnitudes in 1 determining the occurrence such an event. His local causality condition then 
requires that this unique probability be unaltered by specification of values taken by magnitudes in 
any region space-like separated from 1. He shows that no theory of that form meeting this 
condition can explain all the observed patterns of correlation. This is the precise sense emerging 
from Bell’s work in which the observed patterns of correlation are not locally causal. If that 
exhausts the content of the claim that these correlations are non-local the claim is strictly correct. 
But no-one hearing that claim is likely to understand its content to be so restricted, so the claim is 
then liable seriously to mislead. 
 Bell showed that no theory of the right form meeting his condition of local causality can 
explain all the observed patterns of correlation by deriving a CHSH inequality these patterns 
violate. It is becoming increasingly common to call the observed patterns themselves non-local 
simply because they violate an inequality like that first derived by CHSH [1969] and Bell ([2004], 
p.37, p.57). This usage has been extended to apply to what are called ‘non-local 
boxes’—hypothetical devices that would not permit signaling but output statistics violating a 
CHSH or other inequality, perhaps by even more than do the quantum statistics. This extension is 
useful for certain purposes. But it is important to reiterate the fact that such actual or hypothetical 
statistics by themselves have no implications for causation or relativity.14
 Quantum theory does not take a form suitable for application of Bell’s condition of local 
causality. So while it cannot be said to be locally causal, nor does it fail to be locally causal. 
Application of the Born Rule does not yield a unique probability for an event in an n-tuple to occur 
in region 1, but different probabilities relative to different space-time locations that may (or may 
not) be occupied by agents well-advised to base their credences on it concerning events in 1. 
Agents basing their expectations on this advice will (almost certainly) record statistics conforming 
to the patterns quantum theory leads them to expect—the patterns of non-localized correlations 
that no theory meeting Bell’s condition of local causality can explain. That is how quantum theory 
helps them explain EPR-Bell correlations displayed by pairs of quantum systems, GHZ 
correlations displayed by triples, and so on. That is how quantum theory helps us explain 
“non-local” correlations—i.e. statistical patterns of non-localized correlations. The explanation 
involves no causal relations, neither local nor non-local, so it conforms vacuously to Bell’s 
intuitive principle of local causality. It is local in the sense that any actual or potential localized 
agent can apply quantum theory to show that anyone in her spatiotemporal position should expect 
to observe just what she does in fact observe. Section 6 did not discuss the Lorentz transformation 
properties of the quantum states assigned, relative to different space-time regions, in explaining 
observed patterns of correlations. But in relativistic quantum theory these states transform in the 
usual way under Lorentz transformations. Both quantum theory and expectations based on it are 
not merely compatible with relativity, but enhance the abilities of agents situated in relativistic 
space-time to exploit the informational capacities of their world. 
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1. Especially Norsen ( [2009], [2011]), Seevinck and Uffink [2010], Goldstein, S. et. al. [2011]. 
2. (PQ[Δ] is an element of the projection-valued measure defined by the self-adjoint operator Q 
representing Q, and Tr is the trace operation). 
3. There is certainly room to doubt that Bohr held either assumption, and Bohr’s Copenhagen 
interpretation surely lays claim to orthodoxy. 
4. This makes it clear that a claim should be thought of as a meaningful assertion rather than a 
proposition asserted. One could try to model a NQMC as expressing a determinate proposition 
whenever made, though a different proposition in different contexts. But it is not clear how useful 
it will be to introduce propositions into an inferentialist semantics. To resolve this issue it will be 
necessary to develop elements of such a semantics and to apply it to the use of NQMC’s in the light 
of quantum theory,  
5. Bell’s 1975 presentation of local causality (reprinted in Bell [2004], pp. 52-62) took this as a 
generalization of local determinism in a theory. While a specification of the local beables of a 
locally deterministic theory (such as the fields in Maxwell’s electromagnetism) in the backward 
light cone of a region wholly determine the local beables in that region, Bell took it that the local 
beables of a stochastic theory in the backward light cone of a region wholly determine the 
probabilities of local beables in that region. On that understanding, local causality is indeed a 
natural generalization of local determinism: uniquely determined values for local beables are 
simply generalized to uniquely determined probabilities for values of local beables. The 
subsequent discussion has largely followed Bell here in taking it for granted that any theory that is 
a serious candidate for explaining EPR-Bell correlations must be either deterministic (uniquely 
specifying values of local beables) or stochastic (uniquely specifying their probabilities, which 
accordingly themselves come to be thought of as values of local beables).  
6. Note that any apparent overall temporal asymmetry between Alice and Bob suggested by the 
diagram is an artefact of the choice of inertial frame that makes Alice-at-t2 simultaneous with 
Bob-at-t2: a different choice would make Alice-at-t3 simultaneous with Bob-at-t1. Of course, in 
ordinary circumstances the salient choice would be their shared laboratory frame. 
7. What makes a physical situation relevant here is being in the forward light cone of neither 1 nor 
2 and having potential access to information justifying a claim that the state in 3 is |Φ+>. 
8. It violates common cause principles like that of Reichenbach [1956]. Arntzenius [1999] surveys 
several such conditions and their limitations, attributing their hold on us to our physical and 
practical situation as agents in a thermodynamically temporally-asymmetric world. 
9. Peres [1978] registered his dissent from this consensus with the memorable remark 
“Unperformed experiments have no results.” Stairs [forthcoming] attacks what he calls the EPR 
illusion that associates the truth of measurement counterfactuals with “non-local” correlations.   
10. CPP appeal to this formulation of Lewisian strict causal dependence: 
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If c1, c2, ... and e1, e2, ... are two pairwise distinct families of events (i.e. c1 is distinct from 
e1, c2 is distinct from e2, etc.) such that no two of the c’s and no two of the e’s are 
compossible, then the ‘e-family’ deterministically causally depends on the ‘c-family’ at 
world w if and only if c1 □→ e1,  c2 □→ e2, etc. are true at w. 
    In their argument they apply it to a case in which each ci is composed of several sub-events ci1,       
ci2, etc. that act as partial causes of e1 to show that Lewisian causation obtains between an               
event and some of its partial causes at space-like separation. 
11. See in particular Pearle [2009], Woodward [2003]. 
12. In earlier work including my [1992], [1994], I took the possibility of manipulating one event 
by intervening in another as just one element of a cluster concept of causation, and held that a 
usefully revised concept of causation can survive its removal from the cluster. But that 
non-interventionist concept supported a notion of “causal” explanation of Alice’s outcome in 
terms of Bob’s (and vice versa) only in so far as quantum theory can be taken to describe what in 
my [1994] I called a non-separable process linking these outcomes. Interpreted along the lines of 
section 3 of the present paper, quantum theory describes no such process. So one cannot appeal to 
this non-interventionist revision of our causal concept in arguing that counterfactuals like (A), (B) 
have causal implications, even in this revised sense of ‘causal’.   
13. For further details, see my [in press]. 
14. While the condition that a non-local box not permit signaling may seem to have implications 
for causation, it simply requires that the marginal probability distribution for each output be 
independent of all other inputs. 
